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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CREDIT INDUSTRIAL LOAN PLAN, 
a Corporation 
-vs-
PURL F. PETERSEN and 
CARMA PETERSEN 
Appellant 
Respondents 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Case No. 
8162 
The parties in this brief will be referred to as 
they appeared in the lower court. 
The Statement of Facts as contained in plan-
tiff's brief, pages 1 to 4, is accurate, however, defend-
ants would like to point out that the lower courts' 
action on the defendants' motion was not taken until 
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after consideration of the plaintiff's memorandum 
brief against the granting of defendants' motion. 
Based on these facts the defendants contend that the 
loan made by the plaintiff to the defendants could 
not have been made under the Industrial Loan Act, 
Title 7-8-3 U.C.A. 1953 because said loan was made 
"on the security of makers" for a period of time in 
excess of two years and specifically forbidden by Title 
7-8-5 U.C.A. 1953. 
The defendants contend in this brief that the 
trial court did not err and that the judgment of the 
court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF POINl'S 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT EllR IN HOLD-
ING THAT THE LOAN IN QUESTION COULD NOT 
HAVE BEEN MADE UNDER THE INDUSTRIAL 
LOAN ACT, TITLE 7-8-3 U.C.A. 1953. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANT-
ING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AND GRANTING 
JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS ON THEIR COUN-
TERCLAIM. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLD-
ING THAT THE LOAN IN QUESTION COULD NOT 
HAVE BEEN MADE UNDER THE INDUSTRIAL 
LOAN ACT, TITLE 7-8-3, U.C.A. 1953. 
The statement of facts agreed upon by the par-
ties hereto admit that the loan in question was made 
for a longer period than two years from the date 
the note was executed (page 2 of plaintiff's brief). 
Plaintiff advances the theory that this loan could be 
made for a longer period than two years because de-
fendants gave a chattel mortgage to secure the pay-
ment of the note. Plaintiff's argument seems to hold 
that because a loan has as an incident thereto a chattel 
mortgage that it ceases to be a loan made on the 
security of makers even though the mortgage in ques-
tion provides for a deficiency judgment against the 
mortgagors (makers of the note) in case the proceeds 
from the sale of the mortgaged property are not suf-
ficient to pay the indebtedness. (See mortgage and 
page 2 of plaintiff's brief.) Clearly a distinction 
should be made between a loan made on the security 
of property mortgaged to the lender, which mortgage 
and loan provide that the lender shall look only to 
the mortgaged property as security for repayment, 
and a loan which has as an incident thereto a mort-
gage to secure the repayment of a promissory note 
with said mortgage providing that in the event the 
:)roc·eeds from the sale of the mortgaged property 
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shall not be sufficient to, pay the indebtedness that 
the maker of the note shall be liable for the de-
ficiency. 
Defe-ndants contend that a loan made on the 
security of property will be limited to that property 
in the event the borrower does not repay and that 
a loan made on the security 0f make-rs_ will pro.vide 
for eventual and complete repayment by the bor-
rower ~nd that any mortgage given by the borrower 
will be merely an. incident to the promise to repay. 
Any loan which looks. ultimately to the maker (bor-
rower)- for repayment is made on the security of 
s~id maker, regardless of whether or not a chattel 
m_ortgage was given to secure the payment of the 
promise to pay. 
In this instance the loan was made not on the 
security of the property mortgaged but rather on 
the promise of the defendants to repay the amount 
stated on the note in question. It could be argued 
that the loan in question was made partly on the 
security of the mortgage inasmuch as said mortgage 
provided that it was "given as security for the pay-
ment of the hereinafter included note" signed by the 
makers ( d~fendants), but it was also made on the 
security of the makers for they promised to pay the 
amount of the note irrespective of the mortgage. If 
it was made partly on the security of the makers it 
falls in the classification of a loan made on the se-
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curity of makers and it is defendants' contention that 
it could not be made for a longer period of time than 
two years from its date thereof without violating 
Title 7-8-5 U.C.A 1953 which provides: "7-8-5. Cer-
tain acts forbidden.-No such corporation shall: 
" ( 1) Make any loan on the security of makers, 
co-makers, indorsers, sureties or guarantors for a 
longer period than two years from the date thereof." 
It is plantiff's contention that there is no time 
limitation on a loan such as the loan in question. 
This is to say, in other words, there is no restriction 
on the amount of interest a qualified and licensed 
industrial loan company can charge on certain loans. 
This follows from the fact that the amount of interest 
that can be charged under the Industrial Loan Act, 
Title 7, Chapter 8, U.C.A., 1953, depends on the 
length of time for which a loan can be made. Para-
graph 3 of Title 7, Chapter 8, U.C.A., 1953 provides: 
General Powers.-Every industrial loan corporation 
shall have power: 
( 1 ) To loan money on the personal undertaking 
of the borrower and other persons, or on personal 
security, or otherwise, and to deduct interest thereon 
in advance at the rate of one per cent or less of the 
face of such loan per month, and, in addition, to 
require payment in uniform weekly, semimonthly 
or monthly installment~ \vith or without an allow-
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ance of interest on such installments, and to charge 
a fee of $2 or less on loans of $100 or less and a maxi-
mum fee of two per cent on loans in excess of $100 
for expense in examining and investigating the 
character and circumstances of the borrower; pro-
vided, that such examining and investigating fee 
shall not be assessed to any borrower more often than 
once in each six-month period, and provided further 
that no charge shall be collected unless a loan shall 
have been made. 
The following examples are given to show the 
effect of paragraphs 3 and 5 of Title 7-8, U.C.A. 1953 
if plantiff is to be sustained in its argument: 
Example 1. Borrower A wishes lender L (a qualified 
and licensed industrial loan corporation under Utah 
law) to lend him $1,000. A has a good job and a 
father to co-sign with him but has no property . to 
mortgage. A wants his monthly payments to be as 
low as possible. L decides to make the loan on the 
security of A if his father will co-sign the note. Since 
there is no mortgage involved the loan is clearly 
made on the security of the maker and the co-signer 
and therefore is limited to a two-year period. The 
loan is made. A receives $1,000, signs a promissory 
note, with his father co-signing same, promising to 
pay back $1,315.78 in 24 equal monthly payments of 
$54.82 per month. The actual (reaD rate of interest 
A pays on the $1,000 borrowed is 30.31% per annum. 
Example 2. Borrower C wishes lender L to lend him 
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$1,000. C has a good job and a car paid for plus some 
furniture on which he is willing to give a chattel 
mortgage. C would like his monthly payments to be 
as low as possible. Because there is a chattel mortgage 
involved there is no time limit on the length of time 
for which the loan can be made. L would have any 
number of plans to offer for the repayment of the 
loan plus the interest: 
(a) Repay $54.82 each month for 24 months. 
Rate of interest per year-30.31 %. 
(b) Repay $43.40 each month for 36 months. 
Total to be repaid would be $1,562.50 with an actual 
rate of interest per year of 36.49%. 
(c) Repay $40.06 each month for 48 months. 
Total to be repaid would be $1,923.08 with an actual 
rate of interest per year of 45.21%. 
Note: In the above illustrations the amount to 
be repaid and the monthly payments in each illustra-
tion have been ascertained by the same method used 
by several industrial loan companies operating in 
the Salt Lake area and which was approved by the 
Utah Supreme Court in the Seaboard v. Wahlen case. 
___ Utah , 260 P2d 5:36. The actual rate of 
interest is the rate per year on the unpaid balance 
and arrived at by use of the equation R- ~(~i+l) 
R is the real rate of interest, n is the number of pay-
ments per year, i is the total interest charge, P is the 
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principal or actual amount borrowed and N is the 
total number of monthly payments. 
If plaintiff is sustained in its argument it would 
seem that the controlling factor in the amount of 
interest that can be legally charged is whether or not 
the borrower gives the lender a mortgage on any of 
the borrower's property. If a mortgage is given then 
there is no limit on the rate of interest. If no mort-
gage is given and the loan is made on the security 
of makers, co-makers, etc., then a limit to a mere 
30.31% (approximate) per year. It is the defendant's 
contention that such an interpretation of the statute 
was definitely not the intent of the legislature in 
passing Title 7-8-5 (1) U.C.A. 1953 but that the 
intent of the legislature was to put a limitation on 
the rate of interest an industrial loan corporation 
could charge its borrowers. 
It hardly seems reasonable that the legislature 
would leave such a simple and easily found loophole 
in our usury laws. Nearly every borrower will have 
some assets which could be mortgaged even though 
those assets might have little or no marketable value. 
However, by requiring the borrower to give a mort-
gage on those assets (perhaps a discarded radio or a 
simple piece of furniture) the lender, an industrial 
loan corporation, can prescribe entirely the rate of 
interest the borrower is to pay. It is common knowl-
edge that once a borrower has reached the doors of 
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an industrial loan corporation he has usually ex-
hausted his efforts to obtain money from lenders with 
more favorable rates of interest. With the industrial 
loan corporation he will not argue terms or rates 
of interest. He needs money and needs it badly or he 
would not be there and will take it on any terms 
he can get. If plaintiff's argument is to prevail there 
is no protection for the borrower as to the rate of 
interest he must pay on the money borrowed. The 
entire provision limiting the length of time of indus-
trial loan corporation loans becomes ineffectual be-
cause of such a simple manner of circumventing 
same by requiring a chattel mortgage to be given in 
connection with the loan. 
If it had been the legislative intent to allow 
industrial loan corporations to make loans secured 
by chattel mortgages without time limitation and 
thus vvithout restrictions on rate of interest which 
could be charged, the legislature could easily have 
said so. 
It is obvious from Plaintiff's brief, page 8, that 
there was no limitation on the length of loan made 
under the 1925 act; however, that act limited the 
rate of interst to a deduction of 12% per annum of 
the face of the loan. The 1927 amendment changed 
the 1925 act, among other things, by permitting the 
deduction of interest in advance at the rate of 1% 
pp~· month or less of the face of the loan instead of 
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the 12% per annum rate of discount. However, the 
legislature put a time limit of 1 year on loans made 
on the security of makers, etc. If this time limitation 
did not apply to loans which had as an incident 
thereto a chattel mortgage, then the limitation was 
meaningless because every licensed corporation need 
only require a chattel mortgage (even though worth-
less) in order to be out of the reach of the time limita-
tion and hence the amount of interest which could 
be charged. 
While the plaintiff goes to some lengths to pre-
sent a persuasive argument to the effect that the 
statute does not apply to loans secured by chattel 
mortgages it has not shown that the loan in question 
was not a loan made on the security of the makers. 
The fact that the loan may have been made partly 
on the security of the chattel mortgage does not 
negate the fact that it also was a loan made on 
the security of the makers and indeed it appears from 
all reason that the chattel mortgage in question is 
merely a "club" to give some assurance to the lender 
that the borrower will pay the promissory note. 
Plaintiff's argument should not be sustained unless 
it proves that the loan in question was not made on 
the security of makers. Plaintiff has attempted to 
prove that the loan in question was not limited to 
the two-year period because there was a chattel mort-
gage given. It is defendant's contention that even 
though a chattel mortgage was given the loan also 
10 
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was made on the security of makers and as such is 
limited to a two-year period. 
Plaintiff has attempted to convey to this court 
that the purpose of the two-year limitation was for 
the protection and safe guarding of the funds of the 
holders of investment certificates, etc., and also was 
to apply to those loans which had no security other 
than the signature of makers, co-makers, indorsers, 
sureties or guarantors. (Page 11 and 12 of plaintiff's 
brief.) Plaintiff's conclusion on page 12 of its brief 
that "Obviously the Legislature considered that such 
loans were too poor a risk for a period longer than 
two years, but where other security was obtained the 
risk was not as great, and loans for a longer period 
might be justified" is contra the known fact that the 
amount of premium one has to pay for money is de-
termined by the amount of risk involved. Citizens 
lend money to our government for rates of interest 
usually less than 3% per annum. That is done because 
there is little or no risk of not having said money 
repaid when due. 
It would be contra commonly known financial 
knowledge for our legislature to put a limit on the 
amount of interest that could be charged for an un-
secured loan and to intend no limitation whatsoever 
on a secured loan. 
Plaintiff's attempt to mislead this court into be-
11 
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lieving that the restrictions of 7-8-5 were all directed 
to the protecting and safe guarding of the funds of 
the holders of investment certificates instead of 
ascribing sub-paragraph ( 1) 7-8-5, U.C.A. to the 
protection of the borrower from excessive rates of 
interest which a lender may impose is easily seen. 
The 1925 act protected the borrower by provid-
ing that industrial loan corporations could not charge 
more than 12% of the face of the loan. This restric-
tion was clearly for the benefit and protection of the 
borrower. 
The 1927 amendment substituted the deduction 
of 1% per month in advance of the face of the loan 
plus requiring the borrower to make installment pay-
ments during the life of the loan without credit on 
the interest in place of the 12% rate; however, to 
protect the borrower the legislature placed a time 
limit of 1 year on the loans and thus a limit on the 
rate of interest. 
The 1939 amendment increased the time limit 
from one to two years. This, of course, only for the 
protection of the borrower though it did allow the 
lender to charge a higher rate of interest. 
The following table shows the effect the length 
of loan has on the real (actual) rate of interest '\-vhere 
the amount of interest is 1% per month of the face of 
the loan deducted in advance: 
12 
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Real (actual) 
Rate of Int. 
Amount of per year on 
Length of Loan Loan Amount Note Amount Interest Unpaid Bal. 
12 Months $1,000.00 $1,136.36 $ 136.36 25.17% 
13 Months 1,000.00 1,149.00 149.00 25.54% 
14 Months 1,000.00 1,162.79 162.79 26.05% 
15 Months 1,000.00 1,176.47 176.47 26.47% 
16 Months 1,000.00 1,190.47 190.47 27.00% 
18 Months 1,000.00 1,219.51 219.51 27.73% 
20 Months 1,000.00 1,250.00 250.00 28.57% 
22 Months 1,000.00 1,282.05 282.05 29.43% 
24 Months 1,000.00 1,315.78 315.78 30.31% 
30 Months 1,000.00 1,428.57 428.57 33.18% 
36 Months 1,000.00 1,562.50 562.50 36.49% 
48 Months 1,000.00 1,923.08 923.08 45.21% 
60 Months 1,000.00 2,500.00 1,500.00 59.01% 
From that table it is easy to see why it was 
necessary for the legislature to put a time limit on 
the loans of an industrial loan corporation. Not to 
protect the owners of certificate holders of industrial 
loan corporations as Plaintiff would have this court 
believe (page 11 Plaintiff's brief), but rather to give 
some protection to the borrower by limiting the rate 
of interest the lender can charge. What magic is 
there in a chattel mortgage, which may or may not 
have value, which renders the loan one that needs 
no protection by the legislature as to interest to be 
charged? Plaintiff's entire argument on Point I is 
that the chattel mortgage makes the difference-
13 
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takes the loan out of the protected class and that the 
legislature intended that chattel mortgage loans be 
exempt from length and interest rate restrictions. 
In answer to plaintiff's argument relative to pre-
vious interpretation defendants contend that this 
court should not be bound or persuaded in any degree 
by the Bank Commissioner's interpretation of the 
intent of the Industrial Loan Act or by the writer 
of the recent note cited on page 15 of plaintiff's brief. 
As far as defendants have been able to ascertain this 
is the first time the question of interpretating the 
meaning of "a loan made on the security of makers" 
has come before this court and this court only shall 
make that determination. 
The Commissioner's opinion as expressed in the 
above cited letter merely invites subterfuge and tends 
to license industrial loan corporations in violating 
the legislature's intent to restrict the amount of in-
terest on industrial loan corporation loans. 
If this court decides that the mere giving of a 
chattel mortgage n1akes the loan one that is not made 
on the security of the maker then of course 7-8-5 ( 1 ) 
U.C.A. 1953 will be rendered utterly useless as all 
industrial loan corporations 'viii require a chattel 
mortgage in order to be outside the scope of length 
of time and rate of interest limitations. 
The statutes from other jurisdiction cited by 
14 
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plaintiff, pages 15 to 18 of its brief, show that each 
state in one way or another restricts the rates of in-
terest of industrial loan corporation loans. 
On page 16-0regon-Loans made on the sole 
security of makers limited to 18 months. Loans se-
cured by chattel mortgages limited to two years. 
On page 17 -Connecticut- All I o an s - 36 
months except real estate loans. Maine-Two years 
on all loans except loans eligible for insurance under 
National Housing Act. New York-All loans, except 
real estate, for period of two years. Tennessee- (Page 
18 of plaintiff's brief.) All loans limited to two years. 
To construe our statute as plaintiff contends 
would mean that it should be read as if it were writ-
ten "No corporation under the provision of this act, 
shall make any loan on the SOLE security of makers, 
etc." Plaintiff, itself, argues against such judicial leg-
islation-Page 18 and 19 of plaintiff's brief. 
Our legislature purposely worded 7-8-5 ( 1) as 
it now stands. Any loan which is made on the secur-
ity of makers (where the maker is liable for the 
payment of the loan plus interest regardless of any 
security he might pledge or mortgage) should be 
limited as to the rate of interest that loan can pro-
vide. Certainly if a loan is made on the security of 
pledged or mortgaged property no such restrictions 
are necessary as the value of such mortgaged or 
15 
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pledged property will determine the total amount 
the borrower is willing to repay for the loan. That 
security will liquidate the loan, if the borrower does 
not repay. 
Plaintiff's statement on page 19 of its brief that 
the agreed Statement of Record in this matter shows 
the loan in this case to be secured by a chattel mort-
gage is misleading in that the agreed Statement of 
Record shows that "the note was executed by the 
defendants on May 31, 1952 whereby they agreed 
to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $1,376.88 and 
that the "proceeds of any sale made pursuant either 
to the foreclosure of the mortgage or by notice and 
sale according to law would be applied first to the 
payment of charges and then to the payment of the 
principal balance due on mortgagor's note in aq:ord-
ance with its terms, and that the mortgagor would 
be liable for any deficiency," page 2 of plaintiff's 
brief. 
The note and mortgage in question providing 
for judgment against the makers (defendants) for 
any deficiency and the plaintiff's prayer in its com-
plaint for said deficiency judgment clearly shows 
that the loan in question was made on the security 
of the makers. As such it must have been limited in 
time to tlie two-year period as provided by Title 7-8-5 
( 1) U.C.A. 1953. 
16 
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Consequently the fact that a chattel mortgage 
was executed in the instant case has no effect on the 
status of the loan. The loan was made on the security 
of the makers (defendants) and was limited to the· 
two-year length as provided by 7-8-5 (1) U.C.A. 
1963. Be£ause the loan exceeded that time limit it 
could not be made under the provisions of that act 
and thus the j;udgmen t of the trial court should be 
affirmed~ 
ARGUMENT 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAlNT AND GRANTING JUDGMENT FOR DE-
FENDANTS ON THEIR COUNTERCLAIM. 
As was set forth in the agreed Statement of Rec-
ord on appeal the parties stipulated that the interest 
charged by the plaintiff on said loan was in excess of 
the 10% per annum simple interest as allowed by 
15-1-2 U.C.A. 1953. The loan in question showed 
upon its face that it was made for a longer period of 
time than two years. 
The plaintiff is a licensed industrial loan corpo-
ration and to make loans under the provisions of 7-8-
U.C.A 1953 (Industrial Loan Corporation Act) it 
17 
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must abide by the restrictions of that act. Title 7-8-5 
( 1) forbids any such corporation from making any 
loan on the security of makers * * * for a longer 
period than two years from the date thereof. Any 
loan made by an industrial loan corporation on the 
security of makers (borrowers) must be limited to 
the two-year period, regardless of the amount of in-
terest charged, in order to come within the provi-
sions of the Industrial Loan Act and if the loan does 
not come under said act it must be limited to the rate 
of interest allowed by our general interest law-Title 
15-1 U.C.A. 1953. 
Plaintiff stipulated that the interest charged was 
in excess of that allowed by Title 15-1 U.C.A. 1953 
and because said loan was made on the security of 
makers (defendant) and forbidden by 7-8-5 ( 1) as 
a loan under the Industrial Loan Act, it is apparent 
that the defendants' motion was properly taken and 
that the trial court was correct in granting said 
motion. 
While it is true that the result of the trial courts 
decision is forfeiture, that court is only carrying out 
the intent of legislature. Forfeiture in any case seems 
a harsh remedy, yet, we do not question the right 
of our legislature to determine when forfeiture should 
take place. Under our general usury statute a lender 
may charge only 10% per annum on the unpaid bal-
ance. Under the special act for industrial loan corpo-
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rations, a qualified lender may charge up to 30.31% 
per annum, plus investigation fee and this court has 
held recently that the rate could be 3 7% pl~ and 
still be within the statute. 
This seems ~ high rate of interest yet the right 
of the legislature to allow such a rate is not ques-
tioned. 
Defendants contend that the industrial loan act 
should be strictly construed and in order for an in-
dustrial loan corporation to enjoy its benefits (high 
rate of interest) it must comply strictly with its pro-
visions. 
The plaintiff has not complied with those pro-
visions hence it should not be entitled to the benefits 
of those provisions. The plaintiff, itself is a creature 
of statute, and those statutes regulating its conduct 
and granting its benefits must be strictly construed. 
The purpose or reason for making a loan longer than 
two years is immaterial. The legislature did not say 
such loans could be made for longer period than two 
years provided the lender did not charge any more 
interest on the loan for such period but rather the 
legislature said the loan, such as that in question, for 
a longer period than two years is forbidden. 
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CONCLUSION 
The loan in question was made on the security 
of the makers (defendants) and was forbidden by 
7-8-5 (1) U.C.A. 1953 as an indusrialloan corpora-
tion loan and because of that plus the fact that the 
plaintiff stipulated the amount of interest was in 
excess of that allowed by Title 15-1 U.C.A. the trial 
courts decision was correct and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MAXWELL BENTLEY 
Attorney for Respondents 
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